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BOOK REVIEWS

THE CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Utgoff, Victor A., ed. The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 2000. 319pp. $22.95

The Coming Crisis is a series of essays by
noted scholars in the field of national security affairs examining the effects of
continued nuclear weapons proliferation
and the potential for regional nuclear crises. While one can argue that use of nuclear weapons by a rogue state today is
more likely than it was during the Cold
War, discussion of what the United
States could and should do if deterrence
fails has been noticeably absent in recent
years. The authors revive this discussion
and, in doing so, contribute significantly
to the study of proliferation.
The first half of the book addresses the
underlying pressures that cause states to
consider acquiring and potentially employing nuclear weapons. It makes the
case that there are many reasons why a
state may develop nuclear weapons, reasons that may have only a peripheral relationship to security issues. A highlight
of this section is Caroline F. Ziemke’s essay on the strategic personality of Iran.
She asserts that the behavior of a “rogue
state” often has roots in national myth.
These nations may not be as unpredictable and as roguish as we might surmise
at first glance.
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The second part of the book consists of
five essays that examine how nuclear crises might develop between the United
States and a regional nuclear power, and
what the consequences might be. Stephen
Peter Rosen and Stephen M. Walt each
examine the impact of proliferation on
alliances and coalitions, but they come to
contradictory conclusions. Barry R.
Posen conducts a hypothetical analysis of
a Gulf War with a nuclear-armed Iraq.
His conclusion is that, faced with such a
crisis, the United States should not and
probably would not hesitate to intervene
to defend vital interests.
Two essays focus on what the United
States might do following a first use by a
regional aggressor. George H. Quester argues that a U.S. response in such a case
would be driven more by American
norms of law enforcement than by Cold
War theory. Quester believes that criminals are punished for four distinct reasons: to disarm, to make an example, to
impose revenge, and to reform. He states
that once a regime with a modest nuclear
capability has used nuclear weapons, it
will be seen as “too dangerous to live
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with . . . but not too dangerous to
defeat.”
Similarly, Brad Roberts discusses regional
nuclear war termination, arguing that the
United States would have not only to address the immediate problems presented
by the war but also to ensure that longerterm U.S. interests were served by “winning the peace” that follows. The United
States has to avoid being perceived as a
“nuclear bully” whose power must be
counterbalanced, but neither can it come
off as a “nuclear wimp,” unwilling to
confront an aggressor. Instead, the
course of action chosen must show the
United States to be a responsible and just
steward of the international good.
In the concluding chapter, Victor A.
Utgoff contends that in response to a regional nuclear threat the United States
would likely be far more resolute than
others have suggested and would likely
respond in kind to a first use of nuclear
weapons by an aggressor. He concludes
with a number of policy implications.
The fundamental premise of this book is
that sooner or later the proliferation of
nuclear weapons is going to lead to a
confrontation between the United States
and a nuclear-armed state. While there
are many points of disagreement between
the authors, all concur that such a confrontation will be a seminal event and
will define not only the role of nuclear
weapons but also that of the world’s only
superpower in the post–Cold War era.
All students of national security policy
owe it to themselves to consider the policy implications of this premise. The
Coming Crisis will be valuable to them.
JON GREENE

Commander, U.S. Navy
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Lavoy, Peter, Scott Sagan, and James Wirtz, eds.
Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will
Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2000. 270pp. $45

The title says it all. This book is a compilation of empirical and analytical data on
the strategic evolution of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) agents and
weapons in the twenty-first century. A
central theme of the book is how new regional players (states and nonstate actors) are likely to convert prevalent
conventional military doctrine and training into nonconventional means of warfare. The book is very ambitious in its
scope; it attempts—overall, successfully—to address systematically conceptual problems in the integration of such
weapons into the military infrastructure,
delivery systems, command and control
procedures, and war plans. More importantly, the editors and the authors of the
various case studies utilize a theoretical
framework to explain and predict future
trends of behaviors, intentions, and capabilities among very diverse players. Realism and neorealism, organizational
theory, and culture are used to flesh out
these unique differences in approach as
well as in the implementation of NBC
programs and doctrines.
Except for the conclusion and the chapter
on terrorism, the chapters are case studies, focusing on Iraq, Iran, Israel, India,
Pakistan, and North Korea. The authors
are specialists who devote a great deal of
effort to describing the relationship between strategy and policy, on one hand,
and between national security and national military strategy, on the other. The
result is a complex web of relationships,
behavioral manifestations, and decisionmaking processes involving an amalgam
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of scientific, bureaucratic, and military
institutions and forces. In the chapter on
Iran, for example, Gregory Giles eloquently argues that Iran was reluctant on
moral and religious grounds to use
chemical weapons during the first few
years of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–87) but
that its policy changed abruptly as a result of rising Iranian casualties and fear
of Iraqi chemical-warfare preponderance.
Hence, realism became key to explaining
the Iranian NBC doctrinal shift after
1987. Although Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention within a few
months of its coming into force, Iran has
opted to pursue a clandestine NBC program. Such weapons are the subject of
intense debate within the increasingly
factionalized, institutionalized, and secularized Iranian political elite today. This
has given rise to “multiple actors playing
roles in a key strategic program[,] . . .
[ensuring] that there will be continued
bureaucratic competition for resources,
missions, and influence.” More significantly, such competition has far-reaching
political, economic, and military implications, associated primarily with command and control mechanisms. Israel (a
chapter by Avner Cohen) and India (by
Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu) also utilize
NBC secrecy and ambiguity to enhance
their conventional deterrence capabilities—Israel to keep its Arab adversaries
off balance and to avoid American
nonproliferation pressure, and India to
keep China, not Pakistan, in check. Pakistan (Zafar Iqbal Cheema), however, apparently sees the development of its NBC
program as a necessity—not a choice—
because in the “absence of conventional
security alternatives and nuclear security
guarantees . . . [such] weapons were
viewed as a necessary counter [to] a perceived threat from India.”
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The chapter by Jessica Stern analyzes the
dynamics of terrorism in the twenty-first
century. She argues that the potential for
nonstate actors to acquire, develop, deploy, and use NBC weapons is growing.
Stern may be correct in her concern. Yet,
although there is a precedent, in that terrorist groups such as the Japanese Aum
Shinrikyo have used such devices, there is
no hard empirical data to support a sustained argument that terrorists will be
going the NBC route, at least in the near
term. Terrorism has become complex indeed; acquiring, assembling, deploying,
and using NBC agents does not mean
that the selected device will be workable
or effective. Moreover, the cost of embarking on such a program for terrorist
causes will almost certainly outweigh the
benefits. Terrorists, at least for now, will
continue to opt for conventional weapons, albeit at more sophisticated and lethal levels. There is evidence, however, of
more credible linkages between terrorism
and technology, and between terrorism
and international finance.
Ultimately, one cannot escape the fact
that among the newly emerging NBC
players there is a diversity of doctrines
and command structures. This will admittedly make it harder to predict possible political and military outcomes; more
significantly, it means that the NBC genie
cannot be put back in the bottle. Will the
current U.S. debate on the Strategic Missile Defense Initiative exacerbate this already volatile situation?
If there is one criticism to make of this
book, it is that it sometimes suffers from
a lack of consistency in terms of units of
analysis under examination (nuclear, biological, and chemical agents vary remarkably in scale of effects, timing, etc.);
some essays weigh more heavily on one
agent at the expense of the others.
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Comparative analysis should instead generalize, with rigor, about similarities and
differences with respect to common phenomena. This book is, however, a valuable addition to the complex body of
literature on strategy, national security,
and comparative political and military
dynamics.
K. A. BEYOGHLOW

Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Mauroni, Albert J. Chemical-Biological Defense:
U.S. Military Policies and Decisions in the Gulf War.
Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998. 226pp. $59.95

Although we lived with the dangerous
specter of nuclear attack for more than
fifty years during the Cold War, concerns
about the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) have virtually
exploded into our consciousness in the
past decade. Since the demise of the former Soviet Union—once referred to as
our “malefactor partner in the concept of
mutually assured destruction”—our fears
seem to focus far less on the threat of nuclear holocaust, and more on the threat
of attack by chemical or biological
agents. The logical point of departure for
this shift in focus seems to be the Persian
Gulf War, when the world learned of a
rogue nation seemingly bent on proliferating these weapons of mass terror.
In this book, Albert J. Mauroni attempts
a historical recounting of U.S. efforts to
deal with chemical and biological warfare
agents on the modern battlefield. Mauroni,
a former U.S. Army Chemical Corps officer
who currently works as a management
consultant specializing in Department of
Defense chemical and biological defense
programs, provides a detailed look at
what was essentially a “cold start”
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go-to-war effort on behalf of the U.S.
armed forces. The consistent premise
throughout this work is that no one in
the Department of Defense (with the exception of the Army’s Chemical Corps)
was even remotely prepared for an encounter with chemical or biological
agents as it readied for war with Iraq.
Convinced at the onset of Operation
DESERT SHIELD that Saddam Hussein
would indeed use WMD against U.S. and
coalition forces, the Pentagon began
what Mauroni describes as a “mad
scramble” to train and equip U.S. forces
to operate in the presence of WMD
agents. He reviews the preparation to defend against exposure to these agents,
and assesses U.S. efforts to protect its
forces against a highly lethal asymmetrical threat. In addition, Mauroni devotes a
chapter to the issue of “Gulf War illness,”
providing a fairly meticulous and forthright discussion of this controversial subject. He concludes with substantive
recommendations on where the future
focus of U.S. efforts to deal with the burgeoning threat of chemical and biological
agents should lie. At a minimum,
Mauroni’s work at dissecting the policies
and decisions of the Gulf War is important if only as a lesson that the United
States must never again be so fundamentally ill prepared to operate in the asymmetrical environment.
There are criticisms to be made of this
book, however. At the surface level,
Mauroni uses far too many acronyms for
the book to be easily decipherable for the
non-Army (and especially nonmilitary)
reader. Although he includes a list of
abbreviations at the beginning to assist
with the veritable “acronym soup” of abbreviations, it becomes confusing and
tiresome to refer back constantly to a
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glossary to understand what one is
reading.
Additionally, Mauroni’s use of the term
“chemical-biological” can lead one who
is uneducated in the specific characteristics
of chemical and biological agents to believe that there is no readily discernable
difference between the two types of
WMD agents. In reality, there is nothing
farther from the truth. Chemical and biological agents are so different in their
properties and potential effects on the
human physiology that discussions about
countering or mitigating their effects
should remain separate. By consistently
lumping them together, Mauroni gives
the reader the impression that the measures taken for defense and consequence
management against chemical-agent exposure will be essentially the same as
those for coping with a biological threat.
Of greater concern, however, are statements made by the author in the first
chapter. He describes his purpose in
writing the book: “Only if CB weapons
were used on civilians and population
centers would they truly be ‘weapons of
mass destruction.’ On the military battlefield, these weapons, shorn of the ridiculous air of menace given to them by
politicians and the media, are merely another tactical-operational factor like enemy air attacks or unforeseen terrorist
attacks; military forces can and do take
steps to minimize the effects of chemical-biological contamination. If a military
force invests a small amount of time and
funds in planning, defensive equipment
and training, the immediate threat of
mass casualties is avoided, and chemical-biological weapons become merely
‘weapons of mass disruption’ [his italics]
instead of destruction.”
I find these comments both naïve and
dangerously out of touch with the reality
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of WMD agents, and certainly contradictory to U.S. efforts at counter-proliferation
throughout the Department of Defense.
Although we have taken steps to deal
with the possibility of chemical exposures
among our operational forces (which
should be construed as tactical events in
the scope and scale of their effects), calling a biological agent a “weapon of mass
disruption” ignores its potential for strategic impact. The World Health Organization (which currently offers the most
widely accepted casualty estimates for biological agents) predicts that the United
States could incur more than 250,000 casualties in a targeted population of
500,000 from only fifty kilograms of
weaponized anthrax; such an event could
hardly be usefully characterized as a
“disruption.”
There are other places where the reader
may take exception to Mauroni’s statements—most notably, his comment in
chapter 3 that in 1990 the “official U.S.
policy was to reduce the likelihood of enemy chemical weapons use by threatening retaliation with similar munitions.”
The United States never considered the
use of chemical weapons in the Gulf War,
since it had long before decided not to
use chemical weapons as retaliation in
kind. The author’s footnote in chapter 4
regarding the requirement for a company
of bakers to augment a medical unit is
flatly derogatory to the medical professionals who did so much to ensure that
health-protection measures were in place
during the Gulf War. His claim that the
medics were ill trained and ill prepared
to deal with contaminated casualties
since “these practical issues had never
surfaced in the minds of the medical
community” is patently false. Several
hundred volumes published since the
First World War deal with the medical
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handling of chemically contaminated
casualties.
In the end, this work comes off as not
much more than a “hoo ah” for the Army
Chemical Corps, who are billed as having
redeemed the Department of Defense’s
collective ineptitude with respect to
chemical or biological attack. While
Mauroni does offer an accurate overall
accounting of the Army Chemical
Corps’s efforts to deal with the asymmetrical threat of chemical and biological
agents on the battlefield, he gives little
more than a passing nod to the overall efforts of the other services and their collective attempts to counter or mitigate
this omnipresent threat. Readers familiar
with the subject of WMD should be cautioned that there is much with which to
find exception in this work. Readers unfamiliar with the subject should be careful not to conclude that the capabilities
of the Department of Defense are so uniformly one-sided.
PIETRO D. MARGHELLA

Lieutenant Commander
Medical Service Corps, U.S. Navy

Khalilzad, Zalmay M., and John P. White, eds.
The Changing Role of Information in Warfare. Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999. 452pp. $25

Is there need for yet another book on the
role of the military in the information
age? To judge by this volume, a collection
of essays published under RAND’s Project
Air Force, the answer is yes—but this may
be twice the book we need. In this case,
more than enough is not necessarily better.
The Changing Role of Information in Warfare is part of RAND’s Strategic Appraisal
series, and it primarily addresses the effects of information technology on
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American military planning and
operations. The fifteen chapters provide
a useful review of the dangers and opportunities that information technology
presents to U.S. military forces. While
originally intended for the Air Force, the
work should interest a wider professional
audience, especially because it includes a
broad spectrum of views, ranging from
techno-optimists to info-war pessimists.
The editors are well regarded authorities:
Zalmay Khalilzad is a former assistant
deputy under secretary of defense for
policy planning, and John White is a former deputy secretary of defense. Many of
the articles were written by well-known
writers on strategy and information warfare, and the foreword is by Andrew W.
Marshall, Director of Net Assessment,
Office of the Secretary of Defense; he is
considered by many to be among the
foremost thinkers in the U.S. government
on future threats and strategies.
However, roughly half the articles cover
ground familiar to anyone who has been
following the discussion in recent years
about the importance of information in
warfare and the dangers of computer
warfare. These chapters might be useful,
for example, to someone looking for a review of the various ways computer hackers can disrupt military operations. But
because so much has been written on this
constantly changing topic, the more technical chapters do not cover much new
territory and are already slightly outdated.
The chapter on information-age terrorism,
for instance, warns that future terrorist
attacks may take the form of “cybotage”
aimed at information infrastructure. This
may be true, although it hardly is a new
idea; moreover, so far in the information
age, old-fashioned terrorism remains dominant, as the attack on the USS Cole reminded us.
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Similarly, the chapter on U.S. strategic
vulnerabilities discusses the tentative
steps being taken at the national level to
deal with the information warfare
threat—but it has been dated by more
recent efforts at information warfare defense, including the Clinton administration’s National Plan for Information
Systems Protection, published after this
book went to press.
Luckily, only about half the book discusses the familiar territory of information systems and technology. The second
half examines many of the broader questions involved in how the U.S. military is
adapting to the information age.
One of the best chapters is “The American
Military Enterprise in the Information
Age.” The late Carl H. Builder argues that
the most important effect of the information revolution may not be the application of technology to existing missions
but the need for the military to adapt to,
and find, new and different missions.
For Builder, it appears that the American
military’s “enterprise”—its primary purposeful activity—is no longer (if it ever
was) to “fight and win our nation’s
wars.” Deterrence and forward defense
will not play the central roles they did in
twentieth-century conflicts, he speculates,
so the military may find itself reduced to
providing constabulary and expeditionary capabilities, while keeping the military arts and sciences alive for the future.
Jeremy Shapiro takes a skeptical approach to the entire concept of an “information revolution.” He argues that the
information age is not producing the sort
of wholesale change we would expect
from a revolution, either in military affairs or in society at large. He cites the
work of Stephen Biddle and others who
have described the “productivity
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paradox”—the idea that the outlays for
information technology have not as yet
led to the increases in productivity that
would be expected in a social and economic revolution.
If the change is not revolutionary, Shapiro
argues, the U.S. military should not hasten to make radical organizational or
other changes. He quotes approvingly
Eliot Cohen’s observation that the creation
of a corps of “information warriors” today
might make as little sense as would the
creation of a corps of internal-combustion
warriors in the last century.
A chapter by Stephen T. Hosmer offers a
welcome look at psychological operations
(PSYOP), an important aspect of information warfare that is usually neglected
by all but the U.S. Army. Army PSYOP
advocates may not like what they read
here, however. Hosmer argues that although psychological effects are indeed
vital, history shows that actual PSYOP efforts are not nearly as effective in reducing the enemy’s will to fight as are
well-planned combat operations. Standard measures of psychological warfare
effectiveness, such as the numbers of enemy surrenders and desertions, do not
correlate directly with the intensity or
quality of PSYOP efforts but closely reflect the nature of combat operations.
Military commanders can best produce
catastrophic disintegration of enemy resistance, Hosmer writes, not through
leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts but
by sustained, weeks-long air and artillery
attacks combined with deliberate efforts
to deprive the enemy of food, and ultimately with ground operations aimed at
exploiting the enemy’s weakened morale.
His advice may appear obvious, but it
suggests that commanders may be paying
too much attention to technical PSYOP
efforts and not enough to the psychological
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effects of combat operations. In addition,
his research seems to suggest that sustained, well-planned strikes may be more
important than the sudden mass attacks
designed to produce “shock and awe”
that are heralded by many network-centricwarfare advocates.
Additional useful chapters review the
ethical considerations arising in information warfare and examine whether
or not such mechanisms as arms control
and export regimes can apply to
information warfare technologies. An article by Francis Fukuyama and Abram N.
Shulsky reviews the lessons (familiar to a
Naval War College audience) that the
military can learn from business in
adapting to the information age.
One minor complaint—the book does
not offer biographical sketches of the
contributors. A few pages devoted to that
information would be more useful than
the largely unnecessary listing of abbreviations and acronyms. Overall, this collection is useful, but a better introduction to
many of these concepts is found in an
earlier RAND work by John Arquilla and
David Ronfeldt, In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age
(1997) [reviewed in the Spring 1999
issue].
ERIC J. DAHL

Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Szayna, Thomas S. Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1998. 329pp. $25

Since 1989, the U.S. military has been involved in a number of intrastate conflicts
integrally related to ethnicity. These ethnic conflicts have been devastating to
those involved; the conflicts contributed
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to regional destabilization; and they have
been assumed to breed international terrorism. Most saliently, they have virtually
destroyed the hope of peace benefits that
were predicted to accrue at the end of the
Cold War.
The intelligence community was tasked
by the State and Defense Departments to
provide explanations for ethnic conflict.
Indications-and-warning systems were to
be developed and used to alert policy and
military decision makers to impending
crises. It was assumed that good analysis
and prediction would contribute to policies and practices designed to prevent,
manage, or contain ethnic conflict and
thereby minimize damage to international peace and stability. A number of
studies were conducted internally or were
outsourced. The task was apparently, but
deceptively, simple—produce a predictive model of ethnic conflict. The criterion for a successful model was equally
simple—did it work? That is, did the
model provide more information of a
critical nature than could be provided by
country experts, and was it available in a
timely fashion?
Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict is the
public report of research sponsored by
the deputy chief of staff for intelligence
of the U.S. Army. It was produced by a
group at the top level at RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California.
The stated purpose of the project was to
help the intelligence community order its
thinking about the logic and dynamics of
ethnic conflict and to systematize
information-collection requirements.
The authors did not provide a comprehensive explanation of ethnic conflict but
attempted to answer the questions of
how ethnic mobilization occurs and under what conditions it leads to violence.
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The research was based on the assumption that reliance on static indicators and
simple statistical correlation (as found in
many other models) did not adequately
account for change. Change was assumed
to be the political mobilization of “ethnic
factors used to aggregate and articulate
group grievances.” Political mobilization
was assumed to be found in changes between and among groups in economic,
political, and social spheres of life activities. In other words, they were looking
for specific changes in the relationship
between group and state that could signal
future conflict.
Three stages were identified: Potential for
Strife, Transformation from Potential to
Likely Strife, and From Likely to Actual
Strife. The potential for strife was identified in processes associated with closure,
that is, the reification of group boundaries, the strengthening of “us-them”
thinking. The transformation from potential to likely strife—critical to the conceptual framework—was found in the
mobilization of ethnic-political identity
influencing the balance of power between
a group and the state. This transformation was assumed to be found in factors
associated with emerging leadership, mobilization of group resources, and a series
of “tipping” events (similar to the “trigger mechanisms” found in other studies).
Change from likely to actual strife occurred through an interactive strategic
bargaining process; this was portrayed by
assessing the group preferences and capabilities of the state and the contending
ethnic groups, presented in tabular form.
The model was then applied to Yugoslavia,
South Africa, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia.
The best part of the model is its focus on
change and process. The authors probably have that right—most ethnic groups,
under most conditions, live in relative
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peace and harmony; changes in
relationships are generally associated
with competition and conflict under conditions of relative scarcity. But, however
good this assumption, the model was not
adequately developed to test the hypothesis on a variety of cases. The variables, as
discussed in this publication, were very
general; they need further specification
and elaboration. The four case studies,
which purported to apply the model,
were written by situation experts. They
are very informative and make good
reading. Nevertheless, the writing seemed
to reflect the authors’ expertise and perspectives as much as any application of
the model.
If, then, the goal was to provide a model
that could apply statistical methodology
to comparative data and thereby contribute to predicting future ethnic conflicts,
it was not accomplished. Most of the
conclusions seemed drawn from the
analyses provided by RAND’s experts and
not produced by the operationalization of
the concepts or an application of the
model to the four cases. Perhaps because
this was a public document, the actual
data lies elsewhere and the model has
greater specificity and applicability than
appear in this short text.
The critical test of any model is whether
it works—whether it provides more predictive power than an informed observer.
In this case, it is hard to say, because as
the authors note, “the model needs further specification and elaboration.” This
will not be the final book on ethnic
conflict.
As the consultants’ favorite saying goes:
“Progress has been made, but further research is necessary.”
PAULETTA OTIS

University of Southern Colorado
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Swaine, Michael D., and Ashley J. Tellis. Interpreting
China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future.
Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000. 283pp. $20

Michael Swaine, author of the outstanding
The Military & Political Succession in China
(1992), and his fellow RAND analyst Ashley
Tellis have written a very good book about
Chinese security in both historical and future perspective. It will certainly be of interest to the policy community, as it should be
to all who work on Asian security.
Swaine and Tellis define grand strategy as a
country’s “basic approach to politicalmilitary security.” China’s grand strategy
seeks to preserve domestic order, defend
against external threats, and eventually
attain “geopolitical influence as a major,
and perhaps, primary state.” These bland
objectives become vibrant when viewed
in historical context—many centuries
ago, with strong leadership and domestic
order, China dominated the region not
only, or even primarily, militarily but
also in cultural, political, and economic
ways that elicited deference and reduced
the need for military capability. Subsequent periodic weak leadership and domestic disorder reduced China’s ability
to resist persistent threats from beyond
its long, vulnerable border and diminished its political strength, so China has
been united as a single entity under Chinese rule for only about half of the last
1,800 years. Today, China is pursuing a
pragmatic strategy that emphasizes “the
primacy of internal economic growth
and stability, the nurturing of amicable
international relations, the relative restraint in the use of force combined with
increasing efforts to create a more modern military, and the continued search
for asymmetric gains internationally”
(e.g., entrance into the World Trade
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Organization as a developing, rather than
developed, economy). Assuming that no
catastrophic revisions of this strategy are
forced on China, Swaine and Tellis expect it to continue through 2015–2020,
which they identify as the minimal time
frame in which the Chinese economy and
military might develop sufficiently to allow China to become globally preeminent. If this strategy is not derailed (and
that is a major if), Swaine and Tellis argue, there are three plausible long-term
scenarios: that China becomes domestically chaotic, internationally cooperative,
or internationally assertive, perhaps to the
point of global preeminence. Where the
United States is the hegemon today and
for the foreseeable future, China may seek
to be the hegemon some decades hence.
Swaine and Tellis focus on hegemony
based on economic and military power.
However, as China may know from its
earlier experience as a hegemon in East
Asia, there is more to it than economic
and military power. The United States
became hegemonic in the West after
World War II, when it possessed both
economic and military power, and an attractive liberal ideology that provided
profound economic and social benefits.
It led a coalition against a militarily powerful, ideologically expansionist Soviet
Union; when the Soviet Union collapsed,
in part because its ideology was not functional in practice and its empire was held
together by force, the United States
found itself with a global stature of nearly
hegemonic scope. Since 1991, U.S. ideology has reduced the opposition by other
countries against the United States that
might have been expected had the order
it represents relied on military and economic power alone. While many voices,
some in Mandarin, complain about U.S.
hegemony, it provides a robust and
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functional order in which states like
China can develop in reasonable peace.
Though it may not want to acknowledge
the fact, China benefits from the hegemony of U.S. order, and from its enforcement by American naval and air
power.
Unlike the United States after World War
II, China does not appear to offer a globally compelling ideology; in the absence
of such an ideology, increasing Chinese
power and assertiveness may frighten
countries to resist China by generating
power internally or externally. Internal
power might take the form of developing
nuclear weapons. Most likely, external
balancing would take the form of intensified ties with the United States, though
Taiwan, Vietnam, and India all might
have reasons to become better acquainted
with each other; even a weak Russia
might contribute to a China-constraining
coalition. Increases in Chinese power—if
only for defensive purposes, like looking
after China’s energy interests abroad—
might lead to resistance, because no
country could be sure that Chinese intentions would not change. Counterbalancing
would likely become more intense if
China were to seek to move from regional
hegemony to “geopolitical preeminence
on a global scale.” The absence of an adequate consideration of such “balancing”
may be the most significant weakness in
this book. However, this is an impressive
study of China’s grand strategy, and it is
worthy of serious examination.
CARMEL DAVIS

University of Pennsylvania
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Woolley, Peter J. Japan’s Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971–2000. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,
1999. 166pp. $49.95

In 1971 James Auer published The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime
Forces, 1945–1971, “a book that [was]
meant to challenge certain assumptions
surrounding post–World War II Japan
and its military, in particular its maritime
forces.” Thirty years later, in post–Cold
War Japan, some of those same suppositions persist. Of particular note, beliefs
that Japanese rearmament is an American initiative, that Japan seeks only to
provide for its own internal security
while the United States is responsible for
all external threats, and that militarism is
returning to Japan, result in conflicts
within Japan and among its Asian
neighbors.
To many, the U.S.-Japan alliance both
protects Japanese security interests and
provides the cork that keeps Japanese
militarism in the bottle. To students of
Asia, the alliance follows a natural evolution resulting from the congruence of interests of two maritime nations as Japan
reasserts its regional influence. To the
prescient, the U.S.-Japan alliance is the
bedrock for stability in a region rife with
competing interests, developing conflicts,
and unresolved animosities.
Peter Woolley, a professor of comparative
politics at Fairleigh Dickinson University,
has studied and written extensively on
Japanese maritime development. He has
written the next volume in this continuing story of Japan’s defense-system evolution, masterfully picking up where
Auer left off. Woolley provides a concise
analysis of the Japanese Defense Forces’
role in a world awakening to the transitional peace of the post–Cold War era.
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His focus is an examination of the development and potential of the Japanese
navy in the context of the U.S.-Japan
Defense Security Alliance.
Rising from the ashes of World War II to
become a legitimate regional power, Japan has developed the “second most
powerful naval force in the world’s largest ocean.” This has led the United States
and others to press Japan to contribute
more to the security of the democratic
and free-trading world, while its neighbors closely watch for signs of militarism
that would signal resurgent nationalism
and imperialism.
Through comparative analysis, Woolley
presents the development of the Japan
Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF),
and the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF)
generally, in decision-making models developed within each of the book’s seven
chapters. He sees the efficacy of Japan’s
military might and fear of its potency as
catalysts that will awaken the long-dormant
Japanese aim for regional hegemony and
dominance.
Woolley begins by examining the cultural
implications of the expanding role of the
JMSDF, followed by the institutional dimension of the legal constraints imposed
by the Japanese constitution on JSDF activities. In subsequent chapters, he traces
the impact of strategic purpose on the
development of these forces as Japan accepted the role of defending its sea-lanes
out to one thousand miles. Woolley follows with an examination of the domestic and international implications of
Japan’s expanding capabilities and operations as it sent minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in 1991, and how the
incremental changes in Japan’s defense
policy over the last three decades resulted
in tacit international and domestic acceptance of its participation in
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peacekeeping operations. Woolley concludes with a valuable discussion of Japan’s changing defense posture and its
relevance to aiding the United States in
protecting shared vital interests in Asia.
Well researched and meticulously documented with an extensive bibliography,
this book is an excellent reference for
anyone wanting to understand Japanese
defense policy and the forces that affect
it. However, it is more than a book about
the development of the JMSDF in the last
three decades. It is also about the development of Japan’s national defense policy and the forces that move Japanese
policy makers. It is a concise treatise that
effectively uses maps and tables to help
the reader understand key points.
Thus, the reader should be cautioned
that the title of this book does not accurately convey its value as an examination
of the strengths and weaknesses of the
Japanese defense forces—not just the
JMSDF—nor does it suggest the richness
of the author’s analysis of Japanese policy
making. This book provides much more,
and it can serve as an excellent resource
for gaining insight into the most important bilateral relationship of the United
States.
ROBERT MORABITO

Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Lavell, Kit. Flying Black Ponies. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 2000. 376pp. $32.95

Flying Black Ponies is an effective combination of combat narrative, squadron
history, and personal memoir, telling the
story of Light Attack Squadron 4 (VAL 4,
or the “Black Ponies”), a naval aviation
squadron stationed in the Mekong Delta
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during the Vietnam War. During most of
the war, the U.S. Navy made an intense
effort with its Mobile Riverine Force to
interdict enemy arms and supplies that
flowed, primarily from Cambodia, across
the Mekong Delta into the area surrounding Saigon. Kit Lavell’s book is a
readable account of the Black Ponies’ important role in this hazardous interdiction campaign.
The Mekong Delta is not an easy place to
conduct any type of military operation. It is
a lush, steaming, tangled waterscape of
swamps, soggy plains, and rice paddies
crisscrossed with thousands of miles of
rivers, streams, and canals. The canalinterdiction war in the Mekong was limited in 1968 in part by the inability to
sustain close air support. The “Swift
boats,” river patrol boats, SEAL teams,
and the overstretched squadron of Navy
attack helicopters (HAL 3, or the
“Seawolves”) that were already in place
clearly needed assistance. The new Commander, Naval Forces Vietnam, Vice Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., decided that
air firepower was needed that could
reach station quickly and remain there
for several hours. The Black Ponies became operational in the Mekong during
April 1969 in order to give fixed-wing
aircraft punch, mainly with five-inch
Zuni rockets, to the fight for control of
the strategic river delta.
The book follows VAL 4 from its commissioning in San Diego, in January
1969, until its last mission and decommissioning in April 1972. The narrative
also contains useful summaries of Navy
tactics in the Mekong Delta, briefly describing MARKET TIME, GAME WARDEN,
SEA LORDS, GIANT SLINGSHOT, DUFFLE
BAG, ACTOV, and other operations in
which the Black Ponies were involved.
Lavell also weaves numerous other
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elements of the squadron’s experiences
into his account. Lavell was one of the
Black Pony pilots, flying 234 combat missions in the OV-10 Bronco aircraft during his tour with VAL 4. He effectively
describes the frustration of being at the
very end of the line of the Navy’s support
and supply organization in Vietnam, and
of dealing with rear-echelon staff administrators. He also pays deserved tribute to
the enlisted maintenance and ordnance
crews who worked long hours in the heat
and humidity to keep the squadron aircraft safely airborne and armed. He portrays the sometimes humorous and
somewhat disrespectful escapades of junior officers, particularly as the pullout
from Vietnam neared in 1972.
Most importantly, however, this book is
about the pilots of VAL 4 and their combat experiences. In three years of flying in
the Mekong Delta, the squadron compiled a unique and impressive record.
The Black Ponies’ ability to “scramble”
when the Riverine Force made contact
with the enemy continually resulted in
direct air-ground firefights. The combat
action is sharply drawn, evoking the tension, complexity, and confusion of delivering air strikes, especially in close
proximity to friendly forces on the
ground. When strikes took place at night
and in bad weather (which they often
did), the descriptions are even more harrowing. Several of the stories of the aerial
fighting are effectively paired with personal memories of the same engagement
by other personnel involved—river patrol boat crews, SEAL teams, and
Riverine Force troops on the ground.
As Steven Coonts notes in his foreword,
Flying Black Ponies can be read as a characteristic example of the way America fights
its wars. Coonts describes the volunteers
that fought the air war—young men of
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blue-collar or decidedly middle-class
background, mostly from farms or small
towns. Their story is an important one,
and the first-person accounts of individual sacrifice and aircrew heroism are a
needed addition to the narrative of the
Navy’s nearly forgotten war in the Mekong
Delta.
WILLIAM M. CALHOUN

Naval War College

Gentile, Gian P. How Effective Is Strategic Bombing?
Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo. New
York: New York Univ. Press, 2001. 273pp. $36

The issue of strategic bombing’s effectiveness is vitally important to political
and military leaders. U.S. Air Force doctrine has argued for decades that
airpower’s ability to operate directly and
immediately at the strategic level of war
is its unique and defining characteristic—a characteristic that must be exploited. Many disagree, so the debates
have been long and heated.
Gian Gentile, a serving Army officer, now
adds to the literature on this important
subject. Unfortunately, he never really
comes to grips with the key issue of effectiveness implied by the title of his book.
Rather, he has chosen to replow some old
ground, looking anew at the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), chartered
by President Franklin Roosevelt to examine and report on the effects of strategic
bombing in World War II. Measuring
bombing’s effectiveness and examining
the workings of the USSBS that studied
bomb effects are two different things.
The story of USSBS has been told before.
In many ways it is a typical tale of wartime America. A need is identified, resources and personnel are mobilized, vast
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amounts of energy and material are expended, and notable gains are achieved.
At the same time, the path to success is
not a straight line—there is much inefficiency, debate, and compromise. Sausage
is being made.
Gentile does not contest the findings of
USSBS. Indeed, virtually no one has attempted to do so in the five-plus decades
since they were released. The reason is
simple: no one has the time, stamina, resources, or expertise to review the mountain of data collected and analyzed by the
thousand individuals who conducted the
USSBS.
Instead, Gentile seeks to discredit the
survey’s findings by revealing flaws and
inconsistencies in the survey itself. Primarily, he argues that Army Air Forces
(AAF) leaders were so interested in forming a separate air force after the war that
they induced bias into the USSBS. He is
unable to make this charge stick. The
survey was led by noted industrialists,
bankers, economists, lawyers, and other
professionals, most of whom had had little or no direct involvement with aviation prior to their work with the survey.
Gentile admits that General Henry “Hap”
Arnold, the AAF commander, stressed to
these civilian leaders the need for objectivity, impartiality, and truth in the survey’s findings. Yet he treats such
admonitions as duplicitous, despite the
statement by the USSBS head that “at no
time has there been the slightest inclination to interfere with us.”
In truth, it is difficult to imagine that
men like John Kenneth Galbraith, Paul
Nitze, and George Ball could have been
manipulated and pressured to distort
their findings. Common sense and logic
tell us it is more likely that these
men—and their hundreds of colleagues
on the survey— examined thousands of
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documents, interviewed hundreds of witnesses, visited scores of bombed sites,
and then concluded that strategic bombing had indeed been a decisive factor in
the Allied victory, as they reported.
Alas, such a conclusion is unacceptable
to Gentile. He must find nefarious
schemes and schemers, and so he repeatedly questions the motives and veracity
of the participants. For example, when
General Curtis LeMay testified before
Congress that he did not believe airpower
could “win the war” and that a balanced
mix of land, sea, and air forces was necessary for victory, Gentile dismisses his
statement as a “shrewd and bureaucratically astute” tactic to manipulate his civilian superiors.
The USSBS has been controversial ever
since it was written. Small wonder—attempting to measure the effects of strategic bombing in World War II was a
massive undertaking, conducted at a time
when the techniques of systems analysis
were in their infancy. Gentile finds it
troubling that survey members were not
in total agreement. This should hardly
come as a surprise. If the unfolding of
historical events were simple and uncontested, our libraries would be far smaller.
His concluding chapter, dealing with the
survey that analyzed the air campaign of
the Persian Gulf War, is less tendentious.
Here again, however, the author presents
little that is new, and, more importantly,
he does not attempt to address the book’s
ostensible focus—the efficacy of strategic
bombing.
Measuring the effectiveness of strategic
air attack is one of the greatest challenges
facing military planners today. It is an
enormously complex and difficult problem that defies easy solution. Yet as
airpower becomes increasingly dominant
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as a foreign-policy tool, such measurement is essential. This poorly reasoned
and highly parochial book will not help
us find answers to that pressing need, nor
will it foster understanding among the
services.
PHILLIP S. MEILINGER

Science Applications International Corporation
McLean, Va.

Jordan, Robert S. Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander—Airman, Strategist, Diplomat.
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. 329pp. $49

Lauris Norstad was a major Air Force
leader during the defining years of the
Cold War, and except for Dwight Eisenhower, he was the most prominent of all
the Supreme Allied Commanders Europe
(SACEUR) since that position was established in early 1951. Surprisingly, up to
now, nothing definitive had been written
on his role as SACEUR. Robert Jordan, a
professor at the University of New Orleans and an authority on Nato, has filled
that gap.
Norstad grew up in a small town in Minnesota and graduated from West Point in
the class of 1930. Transferring to the Air
Corps in 1931, he was one of that relatively small group of regular-officer aviators who provided air force leadership
during World War II. When the war began, Major Norstad was serving on an air
staff in Washington, D.C. He came to the
attention of General Henry “Hap” Arnold,
who headed what had become in June
1941 the Army Air Forces. In 1942 Arnold
established a select group of young officers, the brightest he could find, to work
in his immediate office. Norstad was one
of them—he was on the way up.
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That summer Arnold sent Norstad to
England to serve as operations chief of
the Twelfth Air Force—Eisenhower’s air
arm for Operation TORCH, the November 1942 invasion of North Africa. In his
war memoir, Eisenhower had this to say
about Norstad: “[Norstad was] a young
air officer who so impressed me by his
alertness, grasp of problems, and personality that I never thereafter lost sight of
him.” Before long, Brigadier General
Norstad was operations chief for the
Allied Air Forces Mediterranean. In the
fall of 1944, Arnold returned Norstad to
Washington, D.C., as chief of staff of the
Twentieth Air Force, charged with
planning the strategic bombing campaign
against Japan. By war’s end, Major General Lauris Norstad, though not one of
the top combat heroes of the Army Air
Forces, was definitely one of its top
comers.
From the end of World War II until the
Korean War, the leadership of the reduced American armed forces struggled
with new questions. Two of the most important were the role of nuclear weapons
and how the U.S. military should be organized. With Eisenhower serving as
chief of staff of the U.S. Army, and
Norstad his deputy for operations (G-3),
Norstad was involved in both issues, particularly in developing the compromises
that led to the 1947 legislation resulting
in the National Military Establishment,
and ultimately to a separate Department
of the Air Force. Subsequently, Lieutenant General Norstad, operations chief for
the Air Force, played a major role in organizing the Berlin Airlift during the crisis
of 1948–49. In the fall of 1950 he became
commander of U.S. Air Forces Europe.
The main focus of Jordan’s book concerns Norstad’s subsequent twelve years
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of service in Europe, in particular the last
six, when he served as SACEUR.
The author analyzes in detail three major
issues confronted by Norstad that were
most significant: the role and employment of nuclear weapons in alliance defense, the Berlin crises of 1958–59 and
1961–62, and the problem of balancing
SACEUR’s roles as both an international
and an American forces commander.
The nuclear weapons issue was complicated by the fact that the British had their
own weapons, the French wanted theirs,
and the West Germans, having none,
were not quite certain they would be fully
defended if the alliance had no recourse
other than nuclear war. As Jordan demonstrates, Norstad was an able diplomat
who succeeded in developing an alliance
consensus on the role of nuclear weapons
in deterring the Soviet Union.
Since Berlin was inside the Soviet-occupied
zone of Germany, it became an ideal location for the Soviets to apply pressure
on the alliance—by denying, or threatening to deny, access to the city. Though
the issues were extremely complex, in a
clear and interesting fashion Jordan explains Norstad’s role as diplomat and
strategist in meeting Nikita Khrushchev’s
challenge.
It is in his examination of SACEUR’s
conflicting roles as an American and simultaneously an international commander
that Jordan makes his major contribution.
This issue came to a head for Norstad
with the arrival of the Kennedy administration in 1961, with its secretary of defense, Robert Strange McNamara. The
substantive issue was the nature, role,
and control of nuclear weapons as an element of Nato strategy. The process issue
was that the administration found it hard
to accept SACEUR’s dual role, tending to
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view Norstad as an American commander
only. The details cannot be developed
within the confines of a review, but in the
end Norstad was forced to walk the
plank—though the final jump was delayed for a period of two months by the
administration’s need for his assistance
during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.
Robert Jordan has produced an important work that is thoroughly researched,
nicely written, and most insightful. No
doubt it will be the definitive biography
of Lauris Norstad—Cold War airman,
strategist, and diplomat. The book will
also be of interest to those involved in the
study of civil-military relations, especially
in these years of increased commitment
of U.S. military forces in multinational or
international interventions.
DOUGLAS KINNARD

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Retired
Emeritus Professor of Political Science
University of Vermont

Crane, Conrad C. American Airpower Strategy in
Korea, 1950–1953. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas,
2000. 252pp. $35

Conrad Crane is a research professor for
military strategy at the Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, and
formerly a professor of military history at
the U.S. Military Academy. Crane previously wrote Bombs, Cities, and Civilians:
American Airpower Strategy in World War
II (1993), which is widely respected for
its rich and adroit analysis. American
Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950–1953 is
a comprehensive, thoroughly researched
treatment of the many issues that the
newly constituted U.S. Air Force faced as
a result of having to fight its first war as
an independent service—a war that it
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was not doctrinally or materially
prepared for, and that the service had
neither anticipated nor especially wanted
to fight. Crane logically takes the reader
through the war from the prehostilities
period, which generally set the stage for
the limited character of the war and specifically established the character of the
Air Force’s contribution; the opening
moves and initial setbacks; the miraculous
end-around at Inchon and subsequent
march to the Yalu; the bitter winter of
1950–51; and finally to the stalemate
along the thirty-eighth parallel.
Crane analyzes the performance of the Air
Force in conducting air warfare in a regional, limited conflict at a time when the
service was focused on strategic nuclear war
and restricted by government policy as to
the resources that could be allocated to Korea. It was a condition that the Air Force
would again confront in Vietnam. The Korean War presented the Air Force with a
myriad of challenges, not the least of which
was the attempt to meet high expectations
for operational effectiveness based on results obtained during World War II.
However, the very nature of the new conflict constrained that effectiveness. A classic example of the limited nature of the
Korean War was the prohibition against
crossing the Yalu River to engage enemy
forces or interdict lines of communication. Crane also takes great pains to highlight how austere were the resources
made available to the Korean area of operations, because the Air Force was required to maintain the bulk of the active
component in a ready status to respond
to other worldwide threats. This requirement was the catalyst for many issues
that arose during the conduct of the war,
among them the decision to recall to active duty large numbers of aircrewmen
who had served in World War II and

17

Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 3, Art. 14
186

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

were in many cases not keen to leave
their families and jobs to serve in an undeclared “police action.”
In addition, Crane recognizes, the Air
Force was challenged by interservice rivalry with the Army and the misunderstanding of its role in battlefield air
interdiction, and to a lesser degree by
negative perceptions created by strategic
bombing at the expense of close air support for the Army. He points out that the
frustration felt by Army commanders
was exacerbated by the effective and dedicated close-air support provided to the
Marines by their air component. The
Army continually questioned why the Air
Force could not provide for it the same
level of effective support.
Crane also rightly recognizes the effective
leadership and operational genius of the
Far East Air Forces (FEAF) planner, Brigadier General Jacob Smart, who was able
to produce a coherent interdiction strategy which he skillfully “sold” to the
Army. Smart recognized the difficulty of
conducting tactical interdiction operations against an entrenched enemy who
did not require much in the way of supply. He reoriented FEAF’s interdiction efforts away from cutting tactical lines of
communications to striking such operational targets as hydroelectric facilities,
supply distribution centers, and other
“deep” targets, all with some effect.
Crane’s book is a valuable compilation of
the contributions of the Air Force in the
prosecution of the Korean War. Crane
reveals the warts but also gives glowing
credit where it is due. Much more than a
mere chronology, this is an insightful
book that is a must-read for critical students of this conflict.
WILFRED F. BROWN

Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College
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Gardner, W. J. R. Decoding History: The Battle of the
Atlantic and Ultra. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 1999. 263pp. $34.95

For thirty years after the Second World
War, historians said very little about the
role of signals intelligence in the Battle of
the Atlantic—because either they did not
know about the Allies’ remarkable
code-breaking successes, or they could
not write about what they did know.
That changed in 1974, when revelations
about ULTRA exposed the full extent of
the Allied penetration of Germany’s signals. Unfortunately, in the subsequent
rush to rewrite the history books to include ULTRA, its significance was frequently inflated.
In this study of ULTRA and the Battle of
the Atlantic, Gardner offers the most
fully developed case yet that monocausal
explanations for the Allied victory in this
campaign are inadequate—that ULTRA
was only one critical factor among many.
Gardner provides two case studies to
support his argument. The first demonstrates that Britain’s growing ascendancy
over the U-boat in 1941 had many causes,
most of which were unconnected with
ULTRA. Just as important as code breaking, if not more so, was the tightening up
of the convoy system and the German
decision to shift U-boat operations westward in order to avoid the increasingly
hostile environment around the British
Isles. The greater availability of escort
vessels and growing American assistance
also played an important part in turning
the tide in Britain’s favor in 1941. It is
therefore a mistake to suggest, as some
have done, that ULTRA alone may have
saved as much as two million tons of
shipping during this period.
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Gardner’s second case study covers the
period from mid-1942 to mid-1943, the
final turning point in the campaign.
Once again, he makes a strong argument
that factors other than ULTRA were essential for the Allies’ success, most importantly the closing of the mid-Atlantic
“air gap” and the increasing number and
effectiveness of Allied escort vessels. By
1943, Gardner notes, it was more hazardous than ever for the Germans to attack
convoys. At the same time, the growing
number of U-boats operating in the
mid-Atlantic made the evasive routing of
convoys extremely difficult for the Allies,
even when ULTRA was available on a
timely basis.
These case studies cover periods when
ULTRA was most valuable because Germany was employing its U-boats in “wolf
pack” attacks on convoys. When U-boats
operated individually rather than in
groups, which was the case for nearly
two-thirds of the war, ULTRA’s value was
much less. Gardner also emphasizes that
there were lengthy periods when German
signals were being read only after considerable delay. For much of the war, he
concludes, ULTRA’s principal use was to
enable the Allies to build up a general
picture of the size and methods of the
German U-boat fleet. It seldom had any
impact on the Battle of the Atlantic at the
operational or tactical levels.
This book deliberately focuses on the
turning points of the campaign and the
broad relationship of ULTRA to other factors; it does not provide either a
blow-by-blow account of the Battle of the
Atlantic or a systematic examination of
ULTRA’s employment by Allied commanders. The period from June 1943 until the end of the war is largely ignored.
However, Gardner devotes a considerable
portion of this book to background
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information about the Battle of the Atlantic, including the importance of economic factors, the role of technology,
Germany’s own code-breaking activities,
and the workings of convoy. This material should be useful for the general
reader even if it offers little for the
specialist.
Gardner’s broad conclusions are carefully
reasoned and well balanced. The Battle of
the Atlantic would have been a harder
and costlier struggle without ULTRA, but
the Allied victory cannot be solely attributed to code-breaking successes. Decoding
History will not be the final word on signals intelligence and the Battle of the Atlantic, but it may put an end to the wildly
exaggerated claims that are sometimes
made for ULTRA.
CHRISTOPHER BELL

Naval War College

Reynolds, Leonard C. Dog Boats at War: Royal Navy D
Class MTBs and MGBs, 1939–1945. Gloucestershire,
U.K.: Sutton, 1998. 260pp. $35

There are few untold stories left from
World War II, but the actions of the
Royal Navy’s Coastal Forces can be described as little known and unappreciated. Serving in small plywood craft
much like the more famous American PT
boats, the Coastal Forces wreaked havoc
with Axis forces in British and foreign
waters. Operating from small harbors
and primitive forward bases, theirs was a
war of small, close-knit crews and close
action with the enemy. They did it all,
from convoy escort to shipping interdiction, clandestine landings to reconnaissance operations, and finally, distant
screening for invasion forces. Coastal
Forces were a ubiquitous presence in the
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European theater. Wherever there were
Axis forces in coastal waters or areas, the
Royal Navy dispatched Coastal Forces to
counter them. Yet strangely, little has
been published about these deadly
fast-attack craft and their courageous
crews. Dog Boats at War redresses some
of that shortfall in naval literature.
Written by a wartime motor gunboat
commander, Leonard C. Reynolds, this
book tells the Coastal Forces’ story with
an authenticity that can only be produced by one who was there. Reynolds
focuses on the actions that took place
during his service in 1942–45, and on the
class of boat in which he served, the
Fairmile D-class motor-torpedo and motor gunboat (MTB and MGB, respectively). The title, Dog Boats at War, is
derived from the nickname given to the
rather blunt-looking Fairmile fast-attack
craft.

extraordinary. Its 115-foot hull had a
blunt semi-hard-chine design and used
four Packard 1,250-horsepower engines
to achieve a maximum speed of
thirty-two knots—some five knots slower
than its German or American counterparts. The dog boats were also small in
comparison to their opponents but rode
better in a seaway. Their superior stability often proved decisive in the rough waters of the English Channel and off the
Norwegian coast. In the end, however, it
was the crews that made the difference.

The Royal Navy entered World War II
with two flotillas of underpowered
MTBs. They proved woefully inadequate
against the German Schnellbooten and
Italian MAS torpedo boats. The Admiralty tasked Noel Macklin of Fairmile to
develop a fast-attack boat to compete
with the enemy boats. Macklin’s design
was ready by March 1941 and was put
into production six months later after a
rushed but successful testing program.
The first boats entered service in the English Channel by early spring 1942. Originally intended as motor gunboats for
convoy escort, they were converted to
torpedo boats while under construction.
Equipped with two twenty-one-inch torpedo tubes instead of a six-pounder cannon, the MTBs proved very effective at
intercepting German convoys transiting
off the Dutch and French coasts.

It took a special kind of sailor to man a
plywood boat filled with five thousand
gallons of highly volatile aviation gasoline. The Royal Navy found their early
crews among the yachtsmen, racing enthusiasts, and fishermen who populated
Britain’s coastal towns and villages.
These early recruits shaped the force that
followed. The dog boats went to war with
small crews of thirty to thirty-two men
commanded by young Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve officers, many drawn
from the Commonwealth. The commanding officers were generally in their
twenties, and most had at least two years
of experience in fast-attack craft. The
crews were also either reservists or “wartime only” ratings. The average age of the
crewmen was between eighteen and nineteen, with perhaps one career regular
petty officer on board to provide experience. The result was a tightly knit, young,
and aggressive crew—ideally suited to the
unconventional fighting that characterized warfare in fast-attack craft. Survival
depended on the commander’s judgment
and the crew’s teamwork. It was a successful formula that served the boats well
from Norway to the eastern
Mediterranean.

The “dog boat” was a simple and robust
design, but its performance was not

The Royal Navy’s Coastal Forces operated in a style not unlike that of light

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss3/14

20

War College: Book Reviews
BOOK REVIEWS

forces of the Napoleonic era. Some of the
actions described here are worthy of the
best adventure fiction. Many boats ran
agents, supplies, and weapons to the underground forces resisting Nazi occupation. For example, the 30th MTB
Flotilla’s boats often hid in caves along
the Norwegian fjords or crept along dark
“leads,” dodging German patrols while
seeking contacts and recruits among the
occupied population. MTBs carried the
kidnapped German general Werner
Kreipe off Crete and transported him to
Egypt for interrogation. They also played
a deadly game of hide and seek with the
Axis navies and the Luftwaffe in the
Aegean Sea and among Yugoslavia’s
coastal islands. Wherever they served, the
dog boats were the force of choice for engaging the enemy closely—and they paid
dearly for it, losing 273 officers and men
killed in action.
Some 228 dog boats were built between
November 1941 and April 1945. They
fought in over three hundred actions,
sinking and damaging innumerable Axis
vessels while losing some thirty-seven of
their own. On the basis of eight years of
research in official records and interviewing people involved, Reynolds has compiled as complete and accurate a record
of the dog boats’ actions as humanly possible. Dog Boats at War is a brilliant, if
occasionally dry, treatment of an important and all but ignored part of the Royal
Navy’s history in World War II. It is
worth its price, and I hope it will be followed by similar works on the Coastal
Forces’ other elements.
CARL OTIS SCHUSTER

Captain, U.S. Navy, Retired
Sailua, Hawaii
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The Navy has had a remarkable and productive group of in-house research and
development laboratories. Sadly, with the
drawdowns of the post–Cold War era,
many have been closed, among them the
“White Oak Laboratory”—the Naval
Ordnance Laboratory at White Oak,
Maryland. WOL, as it was popularly
known, gave the Navy a tremendous legacy of technology, weapons, and people.
Fortunately, that legacy has been preserved by William Anspacher, Betty Gay,
Donald Marlowe, Paul Morgan, and
Samuel Raff in this richly detailed account of the laboratory’s history.
First, the required disclaimer: this reviewer
spent twenty years of his midcareer with
WOL. And good years they were.
The laboratory was built in 1946 in what
was then remote suburban Maryland,
where ordnance testing would presumably not disturb the neighbors. It was an
outgrowth of the Mine Building at the
Washington Navy Yard, and mine development was the core of its original work.
From it came the Navy’s postwar mines:
the Mark 50 series, CAPTOR, the submarine-launched mobile mine, and the Destructor series.
In 1948, high-mach-number wind tunnels captured at Peenemunde, Germany,
were installed at WOL and became operational. With these, the laboratory began
a new line of technological development
for the Navy. From those first tunnels
grew a series of hypersonic wind tunnels
that gave engineers the ability to test reentry vehicles at speeds up to Mach 14.
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In addition to military work, the tunnels
were used by the space shuttle program
to study reentry forces. The laboratory
became the nation’s center of excellence
in hypersonic aerodynamics.
White Oak was never a “big systems”
center, and in that lay the roots of its ultimate demise. Rather, it was a technology center, focusing on ordnance and
system components.
From 1946 on, the laboratory created extensive expertise for the Navy in explosives, warhead design, fuzing, metallic
and nonmetallic materials, magnetic silencing, nuclear weapons effects, and underwater acoustics. The authors devote
substantial chapters to each of these—the
people, the anecdotes, the products, and
the fleet applications. Describing them all
is beyond the scope of this review; that
pleasure is saved for the reader. Fleetsavvy readers will recognize many
WOL-developed components in the systems they use today.
Magnetic-silencing research necessitated
the construction of a unique building made
entirely of wood and nonmagnetic metals.
Up close it looked more like the work of
a cabinetmaker than a governmentcontracted building. Magnetic-signature
and degaussing work at WOL led to the
development and fielding of the drivethrough deperming facilities for submarines at Kings Bay, Georgia, and Bangor,
Washington.
The Naval Science Assistance Program,
under whose aegis laboratory scientists
were assigned to major fleet commands
to solve technical problems and introduce new technical concepts, was created
and managed at WOL. Two generations
of Navy scientists went to sea, wrung salt
water out of their socks, gave the Navy
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new tricks, and returned with solid understandings of their ultimate customer.
Technology developed at WOL spun off
new and unanticipated applications in
the civilian world. Nitnol, a metal alloy
with temperature-stimulated memory
properties, found use in orthodontics.
Research in the mathematics of nonlinear
systems led to techniques for controlling
heart arrhythmia, making a chaotic
heartbeat a regular one.
The legacy of the laboratory for the fleet
is in the technology and hardware now
deployed; the legacy in the hearts of the
alumni and alumnae (and there are many
of the latter) is in the people and the images. Fortunately, the authors have done
them all full service. The book is generously illustrated and filled with the people, from the recipient of two Nobel
Prizes in physics to the fellow who liberated a fire truck from another government installation—White Oak didn’t
have one.
Beyond being a fine institutional history,
the book is a valuable study in public administration as practiced for military research and development. The authors
have unearthed and analyzed an impressive amount of bureaucratic history involving all the players in the Navy’s
research and development hierarchy.
In their analysis, the White Oak Laboratory
suffered from not having a platform-based
mission. As an ordnance and technology
laboratory, it was not the creature of any
of the Navy’s controlling baronies—air,
surface, or submarine. The laboratory
served them all but had the prime responsibility for no platform-based major
weapon system. Thus it was always just
outside the door, looking through the
window but not sitting at the table.
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In 1974 the White Oak Laboratory was
merged with the Naval Weapons Laboratory at Dahlgren, Virginia, to become
half of the Naval Surface Warfare Center,
and it found itself in the surface warfare
community. A long, painful, but inexorable decline in the laboratory’s fortunes
began. The authors’ detailed and insightful treatment of this period, with all its
bureaucratic infighting and personalities,
is an important part of the book. At its
core, the lesson in public administration
is that pure technology and elegant components alone are not a sufficient raison
d’être in the military research and
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development world. Such an institution
must have a clearly defined customer
base and serve it with comprehensive integrated systems.
In 1996, the White Oak Laboratory was
closed, and its people and projects were
sent to other naval centers. At this writing the grounds and main buildings are
expected to become new laboratories for
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.
This is not unfitting. A plaque in the
lobby will remind everyone of what was
once accomplished there for the Navy.
FRANK C. MAHNCKE

Washington, D.C.
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